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Abstract
We test the effects of uncertainty on market liquidity using Hurri-
cane Sandy as a natural experiment. Given the unprecedented strength,
scale and nature of the storm, the potential damages of a landfall near
the Greater New York area were unpredictable and therefore uncertain.
Using a difference-in-differences setting, we compare the market reac-
tions of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) with and without prop-
erties in the widely-published evacuation zone of New York City prior
to landfall. We find relatively less trading and wider bid-ask spreads in
affected REITs. The results confirm theory on the detrimental effects
of uncertainty on market functioning.
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1 Introduction
One of the most startling observations during the financial crisis of 2007 and
2008 was the decrease in trading volume for a large group of assets. Although
prices for mortgage-backed securities, credit derivatives and thinly-traded
assets were still quoted regularly, little trading took place at those prices.
Such market freezes are difficult to reconcile with standard economic theory,
according to which market prices are equilibrium outcomes of supply and
demand and should adjust to changes in the expected cash flows of a given
assets within a relatively short period of time. Therefore, while prices adjust,
trading volume should remain largely unchanged.
Recent theoretical work suggests that uncertainty or ambiguity aversion
might provide an explanation for this drop in trading volume. Easley and
O’Hara (2010) use Bewley’s (2002) model of Knightian uncertainty to model
a market with traders that have incomplete preferences over portfolios. The
traders change their portfolio allocation only if expected utility is higher for
all beliefs in the set of a trader’s beliefs. As uncertainty increases, traders
are increasingly unable to decide which portfolio they prefer over another,
i.e. whether a portfolio reallocation would in fact lead to an increase in
expected utility. In these models the difficulty in rank-ordering alternative
portfolios leads to a drop in trading volume. However, they still quote bid
and ask prices. These prices refer to those prices which would allow traders
to improve their rank-ordering in the light of uncertainty. The increase in
the spread between bid and ask prices is referred to by Easley and O’Hara
(2010) as the uncertainty spread. Other theoretical work by Ozsoylev and
Werner (2011) and Routledge and Zin (2009) suggest a similar drop in trad-
ing volume and a widening of bid-ask spreads in the face of uncertainty.
Ozsoylev and Werner (2011) model a market in which informed traders re-
ceive a private signal that resolves ambiguity about an asset’s payoff. Under
random supply of this assets, uninformed arbitrageurs choose not to trade in
a rational expectations equilibrium, which leads to a drop in trading volume.
Routledge and Zin (2009) model a market in which an ambiguity-averse mar-
ket maker sets bid and ask prices for a derivative. Given uncertainty about
the probability distribution of the payoff of the derivative’s underlying and
rigidities in the market maker’s hedging ability, the market maker widens
her bid-ask spread to reduce the likelihood of trading. In these models a re-
duction in trading volume leads to lower welfare as gains from trade are not
realized as they would be with lower uncertainty. Quantifying these welfare
losses in an empirical setting is an important step towards understanding the
real-world importance of uncertainty. In summary, this line of theoretical
work implies that an asset’s trading volume drops and traders trading this
asset widen bid-ask spreads with increasing uncertainty.
We provide a quasi-experimental test of uncertainty on trading in finan-
cial markets. In the week from Monday, October 22 to Friday, October
26, 2012, Hurricane Sandy developed from a depression in the Caribbean
to a threat to the population of the Greater New York area. Due to the
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unprecedented strength, scale, path, and nature of the storm, the potential
and damages of a landfall were highly uncertain. During this week, trading
at the exchanges in New York City continued as usual. This allows us to
compare trading volume and bid-ask spreads of REITs with property in the
widely-published evacuation zone of New York City (i.e. affected by uncer-
tainty) with the respective liquidity measures of REITs without property in
the affected area (i.e. not affected by uncertainty) before and after the uncer-
tainty. The first group of REITs constitutes the treatment group, the second
group the control group. By jointly using both cross-sectional variation as
well as variation over time in a difference-in-differences setting, we can iso-
late the effect of uncertainty on trading volume and bid-ask spreads from
most sources of confounding variation. We address concerns of simultaneous
increases in the market price of risk and in information asymmetries between
market participants in two ways. First, we show that neither measures of
risk nor measures of information asymmetries are higher for treated stocks
than for control stocks in the week prior to Hurricane Sandy’s landfall. Sec-
ond, we include these proxy variables as control variables in all regression
specifications.1
We find both statistically significant and economically large effects of
uncertainty on trading volume. A REIT with a portfolio allocation of 10
percent in the evacuation zone of New York City had a 16 to 31 percent
lower trading volume than a REIT without property in the evacuation zone.
The exact magnitudes depend on the specification of the treatment and
the control groups. With an average portfolio allocation in the evacuation
zone of about 4 percent for the treatment group, this represents an Average
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of 7 to 12 percent. Assuming that
all of the decreases in trading represent lost gains from trade means that a
large number of investors that would have traded without uncertainty held
portfolios that they may have preferred not to hold. The uncertainty impairs
the market participants’ ability to effectively share risk.
We also find that uncertainty widens bid-ask spreads, as predicted by
theory. The results for closing bid-ask spreads are stronger than for average
intraday bid-ask spreads. Both are in the same direction and statistically
significant, however. If the spread is just a transfer from liquidity suppliers
to liquidity demanders, the welfare effects are ambiguous. If the widened
spread led to less trading due to increased opportunity costs, then this can
also lead to lower welfare. The volume results show, that fewer gains from
trade are realized during periods of uncertainty. Coupled with wider spreads,
this suggests that overall welfare may be lower. In the natural experiment
described here, the uncertainty was not man-made and as such there was no
policy response available to reduce this type of uncertainty. However, this
example highlights the importance of avoiding uncertainty where feasible.
Overall, the results shed light on the economic losses associated with un-
certainty and their potential magnitude, particularly in terms of risk-sharing.
We take the results as confirmatory empirical evidence of the detrimental
1The results do not change much when including these control variables.
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effects of uncertainty on market liquidity as theorized by Easley and O’Hara
(2010), Ozsoylev and Werner (2011) and Routledge and Zin (2009).
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, we add to
the literature on the determinants of market liquidity in general and stock
liquidity in particular. Vayanos and Wang (2013) provide a comprehensive
summary of this stream of the literature. One of the main empirical obser-
vations in this context is the co-movement of market liquidity of different
assets. Uncertainty shocks may be one determinant of this co-movement.
At the micro level, uncertainty shocks such as the one studied in this pa-
per might lead to co-movement of market liquidity at the level of individual
stocks. At the macro level, broader uncertainty shocks such as the financial
crisis of 2007 and 2008 may well lead to co-movement in market liquidity
at a stock market-wide level. As we argue later, such effects are difficult to
isolate from simultaneous changes to other determinants of market liquidity.
However, uncertainty may well be an additional determinant of market-wide
liquidity commonality, as studied for instance in Chung and Chuwonganant
(2014) and Karolyi et al. (2012). In this respect, this paper also contributes
to the stream of the literature that is concerned with the broader economic
consequences of uncertainty shocks. Bloom (2014) provides a survey of this
literature.
We proceed as follows. We first introduce the theoretical implications
tested in this paper. We then outline our identification strategy. This in-
cludes a description of the quasi-experimental setup of the week prior to
Hurricane Sandy’s landfall, a description of the dataset, details on the spec-
ification of the treatment and control groups, the specification of the model
as well as a discussion of whether we are identifying the consequences of an
uncertainty or a risk shock. The results and various robustness checks are
presented in the following two sections. In the last section of this paper, we
conclude and outline potential areas for further research.
2 Tested theoretical implications
This section describes the theoretical models related to this paper. Easley
and O’Hara’s (2010) models traders with incomplete preferences over port-
folios that rank-order them according to the portfolios’ expected utility. One
portfolio is preferred over another only if it has greater expected utility for
each element of a trader’s set of beliefs. This rank-ordering can lead to ties
and Easley and O’Hara (2010) supplement the theory with the “inertia”
assumption introduced in Bewley (2002). Traders change their individual
portfolios only if it leads to greater expected utility for every element of a
trader’s set of beliefs. This implies that traders reduce trading in the wake
of uncertainty when they have difficulties to rank-order alternative portfolio
allocations. If uncertainty suddenly increases, traders essentially “freeze”
their portfolios at the stage before the increase in uncertainty. Despite the
resulting drop in trading volume, traders are generally still willing to trade
and post bid and ask prices. The quoted prices relate to prices which would
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allow traders to improve their rank-ordering and to overcome their trading
“inertia”. The resulting uncertainty spreads are distinct from the asymmet-
ric information spreads commonly studied in the market microstructure lit-
erature. The theory is also distinct from other market imperfections related
to market liquidity, such as participation and transaction costs, imperfect
competition, funding constraints as well as search costs.2
A model by Ozsoylev and Werner (2011) also yields similar implications
of an inverse relationship between uncertainty and trading volume. They
model a market with risk-averse informed traders, risk-neutral competitive
arbitrageurs and a risky asset. Informed traders receive a private signal that
resolves ambiguity about the asset’s payoff, while arbitrageurs do not observe
the signal. Ozsoylev and Werner (2011) show that under random supply
of the asset, arbitrageurs choose not to trade in a rational expectations
equilibrium, resulting in a drop in trading volume.
Another model by Routledge and Zin (2009), in turn, yields the predic-
tion of an inverse relationship between uncertainty and bid-ask spreads. In
their model, an ambiguity-averse market maker sets bid and ask prices for a
derivative and faces random buy and sell orders. There is uncertainty about
the probability distribution of the payoff for the derivative’s underlying and
the market maker can trade this underlying to partially hedge her derivative
position. Routledge and Zin (2009) show that in cases of a rigidity in the
market maker’s hedging ability, she widens bid-ask spreads to reduce the
likelihood of further derivative trades.
In summary, these theoretical models have two main implications:
Implication 1 Trading volume decreases with uncertainty.
Implication 2 Bid-ask spreads increase with uncertainty.
3 Identification strategy
Testing these theoretical implications is challenging since uncertainty shocks
are rare, many of them have no clear beginning or end and they usually
co-occur with other events. Three ideal experimental setups would allow a
clear-cut identification of the effects of uncertainty on trading volume and
spreads:
1. Trading of two (or more) assets is observed cross-sectionally, with one
asset being affected by an uncertainty shock (treatment) and one asset
not (control). The effect of the “uncertainty treatment” could then
be determined by calculating the cross-sectional difference in trading
volume and spreads (“simple differences” to determine “between vari-
ation”). The critical identifying assumption is that trading volume
and spreads are the same in the absence of treatment, i.e. all other
determinants are the same.
2Vayanos and Wang (2013) provide a comprehensive review of the alternative determinants
of market liquidity.
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2. Trading of one (or more) assets is observed before and during (or dur-
ing and after) an uncertainty shock. The effect of the uncertainty
treatment could then be determined by calculating the difference in
trading volume and spreads over time (“simple differences” to deter-
mine “within variation”). The two critical identifying assumptions
are that all other determinants of trading volume and spreads remain
unchanged around this uncertainty shock and that any pre-treatment
trend in the outcome variable of interest is removed when calculating
the differences over time.
3. Both previous setups combined. In this setting, the effect of the un-
certainty treatment could be determined in two steps (“difference in
differences”): First, for both treatment and control asset, the differ-
ence in trading volume and spreads before and during (or during and
after) the uncertainty shock is calculated. Second, the resulting differ-
ences are then differenced again between the treatment and the control
asset(s). By taking this double-difference approach, the setup does not
need the identifying assumptions of the first setup and only the second
identifying assumption of the second setup. In this case, the trend-
assumption implies that the treatment and the control asset(s) have
the same trend in the outcome variable of interest before (or after) the
uncertainty treatment, commonly referred to as the “parallel trends”
assumption.
The third experimental setup is particularly attractive, as it addresses both
cross-sectional confounding variation, such as non-comparable treatment
and control assets, as well as confounding variation over time, such as co-
occurrence of shocks to trading volume and spreads other than uncertainty
shocks.
In practice, the main difficulty lies in finding assets and the respective
uncertainty shocks that come sufficiently close to these ideals. For instance,
the uncertainty about the fair value of mortgage-backed securities at the
beginning of the financial crisis did affect all mortgage-backed securities at
once. Identification of the treatment effect would be possible if all other
determinants of trading outcomes would have stayed the same (second ex-
perimental setup), which is not the case however. Most prominently, shocks
to the funding structure of market participants coincided with the uncer-
tainty shock at the beginning of the crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009), making the
identification of the effect of interest virtually impossible.
In this paper, we use location information on the properties of REITs,
which are listed property investment firms, to identify stocks that can be
expected to be affected by damages due to Hurricane Sandy. We identify a
set of REITs with property in the well-published evacuation zone of New York
City and compare their trading volume and bid-ask spreads in the week prior
to the landfall of Sandy with REIT stocks without properties in the affected
area. In the following, we describe the setting of Hurricane Sandy as well as
the treatment effect estimation approach in more detail.
6
3.1 Setting of natural experiment
3.1.1 Trading week before Hurricane Sandy made landfall
Hurricane Sandy was the strongest Hurricane of the 2012 season. Formed
in the Caribbean, declared a tropical storm on Monday, October 22, and a
Hurricane on Wednesday, October 24, by the United States National Hur-
ricane Center (NHC). Sandy made landfall near Kingston, Jamaica as a
Category 2 hurricane on the same day and near Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, as
a Category 3 hurricane on the following day. Both countries were severely
affected by damages and disruptions due to the storm. In Jamaica, about
70 percent of the country’s population was without power, airports were
closed and authorities mandated a 48-hour curfew. In Cuba, damages were
particularly severe in Santiago de Cuba, where more than 15,000 homes
were destroyed and more than 100,000 homes were damaged. Sandy’s outer
bands also caused many deaths and damages in neighboring countries, par-
ticularly Haiti, where more than 50 people were killed and food shortages
and wide-ranging damages hit a country that still had not fully recovered
from the 2010 earthquake. These dramatic developments were widely re-
ported in the media and raised interest in the projected path of the storm.
Figure 1 illustrates the increasing news coverage of Hurricane Sandy during
this time period with the number of articles mentioning the hurricane in the
LexisNexis database.
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Figure 1: Number of media mentions of Hurricane Sandy in Lexis Nexis
The period between Monday, October 22, and Sunday, October 28, 2012 corresponds to
the seven days before Hurricane Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012, i.e. the week
of uncertainty.
Over the course of the trading week from Monday, October 22 to Fri-
day, October 26, 2012 it became increasingly clear that Sandy might make
landfall in the North-East of the United States and would not move east
towards the open Atlantic Ocean, like most hurricanes. While the European
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Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) correctly predicted
this development on Tuesday, October 23, 2012, the United States National
Weather Service (NWS) and the NHC forecasted this path only towards the
end of the trading week. Figure 2 shows the widely reported storm path
maps by the NWS.
While other hurricanes had hit the North East of the United States
before, the meteorological and hydrological setting of Hurricane Sandy was
rare, if not unique: Tropical storms usually have a compact wind field that
circles around a low-pressure center. Such storms draw their energy from
the warm water of the tropical Atlantic Ocean. As Hurricane Sandy moved
northwards, however, it merged with a weather system arriving from the west
and became an extra-tropical storm, which differ in that they are fueled by
sharp temperature differences between masses of warm and cool air. Extra-
tropical storms also differ from tropical storms in that they have much larger
and dispersed wind fields. In the case of Sandy, the wind fields retained much
of the hurricane-force winds. In the media, this development lead to the
imagery of “Frankenstorm” meeting his “bride”, although later Hurricane
Sandy was more often called “Superstorm”. At the same time, the prediction
of high tide at landfall suggested a combination of both coastal flooding and
heavy rainfall. This created a setting which probably had not been observed
since 1821 (Brandon et al., 2014).
Another unique feature of Hurricane Sandy was that it was expected
to hit not only the Greater New York area and but also New York City,
the most densely populated metropolitan area in the United States. While
Hurricane Irene hit New York City in the previous year, leading to a redefi-
nition of evacuation plans and emergency procedures, it was unclear whether
these new measures would be sufficient to protect lives and to prevent severe
damage to buildings, infrastructure and the local economy.
Overall, the uncertainty caused by Hurricane Sandy in the trading week
from Monday, October 22 to Friday, October 26, 2012 had two main sources:
First, the path of Hurricane Sandy was highly uncertain. While projections
by the ECMWF showed that Sandy might well make landfall in the North-
East, the NHC forecasts predicted such a path of the hurricane only later in
the week. Second, the unprecedented nature and expected intensity of the
storm had unforeseeable consequences for the Greater New York area and
for the affected REITs in particular.
3.1.2 Landfall of Hurricane Sandy
The authorities of the State of New York and of New York City took the
immediate threat very seriously. On Friday, October 26, 2012, New York’s
Governor Cuomo declared a statewide state of emergency. President Obama
signed a pre-disaster declaration later that day. All airports, major tunnels
and bridges as well as public transportation were suspended until the early
morning of Monday, October 29, 2012, the day when Hurricane Sandy was
expected to make landfall. Importantly, trading on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) was also suspended. Mayor Bloomberg also ordered the
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(a) Monday, October 22, 10am (b) Tuesday, October 23, 7pm
(c) Wednesday, October 24, 7pm (d) Thursday, October 25, 7am
(e) Friday, October 26, 4am
Figure 2: NHC track forecast cone for Hurricane Sandy
Colored coastal regions indicate NHC weather warnings: hurricane warning (red), hurricane
watch (pink), tropical storm warning (blue) and tropical storm watch (yellow). Current
position of center of cyclone is shown as an orange dot. Other dots in forecast cone indicate
forecasted position of center at specific point in time. Dots are filled black if cyclone is
expected to be tropical and white if cyclone is expected to be extra-tropical. Letters
in dots indicate forecasted intensity: D = Tropical depression, S = tropical storm, H =
hurricane, M = major hurricane. Solid white part of cone shows forecast for next three
days, non-filled part of cone shows forecast for the following two days. Time information
is presented in Eastern Standard Time (EST).
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Table 1: Chronology of Hurricane Sandy
Trading week before Hurricane Sandy made landfall
Monday, October 22 • Sandy is declared a tropical storm
Tuesday, October 23 • ECMWF predicts that Sandy will make landfall in the
North-East of the United States
• NHC predicts that Sandy will turn East towards the
North Atlantic
•Media reporting mostly focuses on NHC predictions
Wednesday, October 24 • Sandy is declared a hurricane
• Landfall near Kingston, Jamaica (Category 2)
• About 70 percent of Jamaican population is without
power, airports are closed, 48-hour curfew
Thursday, October 25 • Landfall near Santiago de Cuba, Cuba (Category 3)
• Severe damage, particularly around Santiago de Cuba,
with 15,000 homes destroyed and 100,000 homes dam-
aged
• Sandy’s outer bands affect neighboring countries, par-
ticularly Haiti
• Broad media coverage of damage
Friday, October 26 • Early in the morning, NHC revises predictions, indicat-
ing landfall in North East of United States
• Forecasted merger of tropical cyclone with weather sys-
tem coming from the East is illustrated in the media as
“Frankenstorm” meeting his “bride”
• Governor Cuomo declares statewide state of emergency,
President Obama signs pre-disaster declaration
• Last trading day before Sandy makes landfall
Landfall of Hurricane Sandy
Saturday, October 27 •Mayor Bloomberg warns New Yorkers to prepare for ar-
rival of Sandy and announces shutdown of public trans-
portation starting on Sunday
Sunday, October 28 •Mayor Bloomberg orders evacuation of sub-evacuation
zone A
•Most of public transportation suspended
Monday, October 29 • At around 8pm Sandy makes landfall near Atlantic City,
New Jersey
• Severe flooding, power and gas outages
Tuesday, October 30 • Damage inspection, first respondent activities and res-
cue missions dominate media reports
• Exchanges remain closed
Trading week after Hurricane Sandy made landfall
Wednesday, October 30 to
Friday, November 02
• Exchanges reopen on Wednesday morning, the first
trading day after the landfall
•Wide-ranging recovery and reconstruction activities
• Public life gets restored step-by-step
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evacuation of the first part of the evacuation zone redefined after Hurricane
Irene had hit New York City the previous year.
After Hurricane Sandy made landfall on the evening of Monday, October
29, 2012, the precautionary measures turned out to be more than necessary.
Hurricane Sandy caused severe damages to the Greater New York area in
general and New York City in particular. Severe floodings in many parts of
the city, both overground and in tunnels underground, power and gas outages
took their toll, several buildings and construction sites were damaged.
3.1.3 Trading week after Hurricane Sandy made landfall
Although schools remained closed for the entire week of Monday, October
29 to Friday, November 02, 2012 and the trading floor of the NYSE had been
flooded, trading resumed on Wednesday 31. The two-day weather closure
therefore separates the time before and after Hurricane Sandy made landfall.
Table 1 provides an overview of the chronology of events.
3.2 Description of dataset
Our dataset consists of a sample of U.S. “equity” REITs, which primarily
invest directly in the real estate market and which form the largest REIT
subclass.3 REITs can be either privately traded or publicly listed. Our sam-
ple consists of publicly traded REITs on the NYSE, where the majority of the
listed REITs are traded. REITs operate under a relatively strict regulatory
framework, which real estate investment firms may apply for. Among other
things, REITs are forced to pay out at least 90 percent of their taxable income
in the form of dividends, at least 75 percent of a REIT’s assets have to be
invested in real estate and 75 percent of a REIT’s gross income has to come
from operating these properties. The main benefit of accepting the limi-
tations of the REIT framework is that dividends are tax-deductible, which
prevents double-taxation and grants REITs a beneficial tax status. Over-
all, REITs constitute a very homogeneous group of firms, which leaves the
investment portfolio as the main differentiating factor across REITs.
Public equity REITs are very transparent concerning their investment
portfolio. In their annual report, they provide detailed information on the
properties they own, including addresses as well as book values. SNL records
this information and also provides geo-coordinates for each recorded prop-
erty, which allows matching with other geo-coded data, such as with the
hurricane evacuation zone information outlined in the next section.
In compiling the dataset, we combine data on firm fundamentals and
individual property portfolio information from SNL with daily trading data
from CRSP and intraday trading data from the NYSE Daily Trade and Quote
Database (DTAQ). We match all firms marked as REIT in CRSP and marked
as equity REIT in SNL based on their CUSIP code. We use daily data from
3In contrast to “mortgage” REITs, which primarily invest in mortgage-backed securities
and other debt-related financial instruments and “hybrid” REITs, which combine both
investment styles.
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CRSP and drop observations for which the bid price exceeds the ask price,
the average share price per quarter is below 1$ (i.e. penny stocks), the data
was not recorded on the primary exchange, exchange changes took place
during the observation period, less than 30 daily observations per quarter
or than 3 observations per week were available. Data from SNL is dropped
if individual balance sheet items exceed the amount of total assets or total
assets are unavailable. All variables calculated from SNL data are winsorized
at the 5% and 95% level. We limit our sample to observations for 2012, but
account for time lags as defined later.4 After data cleaning and merging we
are left with a balanced sample of 77 REITs. We then merge data from DTAQ
to the firms in the sample using their CUSIP code.
Our dependent variables are the dollar volume of a stock as a measure
of trading volume as well as three different measures of bid-ask spreads. We
use CRSP data at daily frequency to determine the trading volume and the
bid-ask spread at closing time of a given trading day. The variables are
determined for each firm i and trading day d as follows:
Dollar volumei,d = No. of shares tradedi,d · Closing pricei,d
Closing spreadi,d =
Closing ask pricei,d − Closing bid pricei,d
1/2(Closing ask pricei,d + Closing bid pricei,d)
In order to address concerns about closing spreads from CRSP not being
fully representative of bid-ask spreads over the course of a given trading day
(for instance discussed in Chung and Zhang (2014)), we additionally calcu-
late quoted spread and effective spread using DTAQ intraday data following
Holden and Jacobsen (2014). We calculate them for each stock i as follows:
Quoted spreadi,t =
Ask pricei,t − Bid pricei,t
Mi,t
Effective spreadi,t =
|Traded pricei,t −Mi,t|
Mi,t
with midpoint price Mi,t = 1/2 × (Ask pricei,t + Bid pricei,t) and subscripts
t, d and w denoting variables at intraday, daily and weekly frequency re-
spectively. We incrementally aggregate the liquidity measures from intraday
to daily frequency (t → d) and from daily to weekly frequency (d → w) by
averaging. A high dollar volume indicates high market liquidity, while a high
spread measure indicates low market liquidity.
Using data from SNL, CRSP and DTAQ, we also define a number of other
variables that serve as proxies to compare the treated and non-treated REITs
and as control variables. Most importantly, we use DTAQ data to calculate
intraday volatility as a measure of risk and price impact as a measure of
4For a consistent presentation of the results, we also drop three firms which do not have
data available for all weeks of 2012, but our results are not sensitive to this data restriction.
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information asymmetries between market participants as follows:
Intraday volatilityi,d =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
close∑
t=open
(Ri,t − R¯)2
Price impacti,t = Di,t
Mi,t+5min −Mi,t
Mi,t
with Ri,t denoting 5-minute returns of the respective midpoint price (Mi,t)
and Di,t being +1 for buyer initiated trades and −1 for seller initiated trades.
Intraday volatility is aggregated from daily to weekly frequency (d → w)
by averaging; price impact is first aggregated to daily frequency (t → d)
and subsequently to weekly frequency (d → w) by averaging as well. All
remaining variable definitions are provided in subsection A.1.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the whole year of 2012. All
liquidity measures are right-tailed and approximatively log-normally dis-
tributed. The mean5 dollar volume for the whole year of 2012 was about
$30.8m, with a standard deviation of about $40.8m, a minimum of $0.1m
and a maximum of $482.2m; the mean closing spread amounted to 7.7 basis
points, with a standard deviation of 7.3 basis points, a minimum of 0.7 basis
points and a maximum of 108.2 basis points; the mean quoted spread for 2012
was about 17.2 basis points, with a standard deviation of 33.1 basis points,
a minimum of 2.1 basis points and a maximum of 486.7 basis points; the
mean effective spread for 2012 was about 9.4 basis points, with a standard
deviation of 8.7 basis points, a minimum of 1.9 basis points and a maximum
of 79.1 basis points. For all further analyses, we use log-transformations of
the respective liquidity measures.
3.3 Specification of treatment intensity
To identify the effects of uncertainty on trading volume and bid-ask spreads,
the quasi-experimental setup described earlier requires a clear separation of
those stocks that were affected by the uncertainty shock (treated stocks) and
those that were not (control stocks). We base the separation of treatment
and control firms on the definition of the evacuation zone of New York City.
The evacuation zone was widely published by the media as well as on a
dedicated website6 which allowed checking addresses of specific buildings for
whether they were in the evacuation zone. At the time, three sub-evacuation
zones – A, B and C, in order of decreasing danger of flooding – had been
established. Detailed information on these zones was also available for down-
load from the website of the City of New York in the form of Keyhole Markup
Language (KML) files, which can be imported in a Geographical Information
System (GIS). Using the “Wayback Machine” of the Internet Archive7, we
5Due to the aggregation to weeks, an indicated mean value corresponds to the average of
the weekly averages of a given liquidity measure.
6The most recent version of this website is available under the following URL:
http://maps.nyc.gov/hurricane
7Accessible under the following URL: http://archive.org
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obtained the KML files as of November 20, 2011. This corresponds to the
evacuation areas redefined after Hurricane Irene had hit New York City in
August of 2011.8
We define treated stocks as those stocks with property in one of the
three evacuation zones. For this purpose, we match the geo-coded location
of individual properties from SNL with the geo-information provided by the
KML files using GIS software. We use data on individual property’s book
values from the end of 2011 as this is the last time period for which this
information is widely available. Our treatment intensity variable is then
defined as the percentage share of the book value of the properties located
in the evacuation area. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of properties in
the Greater New York area in general and Manhattan in particular (see also
Figure A.2.1). Out of the 77 REITs in our sample, 21 REITs had property
in the evacuation zone. The share in total book value, i.e. the treatment
intensity, ranges between 0.3 percent and 16.4 percent.
While other cities in New York and neighboring states were also poten-
tially affected by Hurricane Sandy, the choice of New York City is attractive
for three reasons. First, a significant part of the (professional) traders trad-
ing REITs is likely to be located in New York City or at least have to be
considered knowledgeable of the area. Market participants were therefore
likely to discriminate between firms with properties subject to storm dam-
age and firms with a lower likelihood of property damage. Second, even if
traders were not located in New York City, media reports concentrate on
New York City when reporting from the Greater New York area. It is there-
fore likely that information on potential damages of Hurricane Sandy was
more readily available for this area. Third, the information set provided by
the City of New York on evacuation zones was much more detailed and was
made more widely available than for other cities in the area.
The group of control stocks are defined in two different ways. The first
control group (C1) includes all firms without any property in the evacuation
zone of New York City. This applies to 56 REITs in the sample. While this
approach maximizes the number of observations available for identifying the
causal effect of interest, it has the disadvantage of including firms with prop-
erties in other areas potentially affected by Hurricane Sandy. The second
control group (C2) therefore only includes those firms, which did not have
any property in the states of New York and New Jersey. This group consists
of 20 REITs. While Hurricane Sandy also caused damage in other states, the
most severe damage had to be expected in potential flooding areas where the
initial landfall would occur. Over the course of the week before Hurricane
Sandy made landfall, it became more and more clear that Lower New York
and New Jersey were likely to be the most affected areas.
The assignment mechanism underlying the above definition of the treat-
ment group and the respective control groups is not completely random with
8Hurricane Irene had much less significant consequences for New York City than Hurricane
Sandy, not only retrospectively but also in terms of the potential consequences before the
storms made landfall.
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Figure 3: REIT properties in New York City
Individual properties are shown as black circles. The sub-evacuation zones are colored in
red: Zone A in dark red, zone B in medium red, zone C in light red.
respect to the outcome variables of interest. This is due to the fact that the
selection of the treatment units was based on geographical similarity. In
turn, geographic similarity of firms has been shown to lead to co-movement
in stock liquidity measures if a liquidity determinant is determined on a ge-
ographical level Bernile et al. (2015). In the difference-in-differences setup
suggested in this paper, however, such confounding variation would have to
occur in parallel to the uncertainty shock in the week prior to the land-
fall of Hurricane Sandy. In subsection 3.5 we discuss potential sources of
confounding variation.
3.4 Model specification
The difference-in-differences specifications used for identification are similar
in spirit to the specification suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004):
log(yi,w) = β0dw=43 + β1(dw=43 · Ti) +Xi,wZ +Di=jΓ
+Dw=u∆ + i,w
(1)
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where i and w index firms and weeks, yi,w denotes dollar volume or measures
of the bid-ask spread, di and dw are indicator variables identifying firms and
weeks, w = 43 denotes the week of uncertainty prior to Hurricane Sandy’s
landfall, Di and Dw denote firm and time fixed effects, i.e. matrices of dj ’s
and du’s using the first firm’s identifier and the first week as base category
(j > 1 and u > 1) and not containing the week prior to Hurricane Sandy’s
landfall (u 6= 43). Ti denotes the treatment intensity defined in the previous
section. It is not separately included in the specification since it is time-fixed
and is already captured by the firm-fixed effects Di. The treatment group
is defined as those i for which Ti > 0, the control group as those i for which
Ti = 0. The effect of the week of uncertainty on the respective liquidity
measures is given by β1. Xi,w contains additional control variables.
We further split up this net effect into an “initial treatment effect” and
a “treatment reversal effect” with the following second specification:
log(yi,w) = β0dw>42 + β1dw>43 + β2(dw>42 · Ti) + β3(dw>43 · Ti)
+Xi,wZ +Di=jΓ +Dw=u∆ + i,w .
(2)
The respective uncertainty effects are then given by β2 and β3.
The firm fixed effects serve the purpose of controlling for pre-treatment
differences in the respective liquidity measures and thereby implicitly hold-
ing all time-constant firm-specific determinants of stock liquidity fixed. This
assumption is particularly reasonable for REITs, which – due to their regu-
latory regime – can change many aspects of their business only slowly and
our sample period is short. We nevertheless include a set of control vari-
ables with time-varying firm-specific determinants of stock liquidity, which
are further discussed in subsection 3.5 and section 5.
The measurement effect of including firm fixed effects depends on the
length of the pre-treatment sample period: With a rather short pre-treatment
sample period, the treatment effect is measured relative to recent stock liq-
uidity levels and to recent time-constant firm-specific determinants of stock
liquidity. With a longer pre-treatment sample period, the treatment effect is
measured relative to the longer-term stock liquidity levels and to longer-term
firm-specific determinants of stock liquidity.
The choice of the post-treatment sample period hinges on a trade-off
between having enough observations for identifying “treatment reversal ef-
fects” and not systematically causing endogeneity problems. Post-treatment
observations are – by definition – endogenous with respect to the treatment.
For instance, after Hurricane Sandy made landfall, asymmetric information
on building repairs for the treatment group’s property portfolios could lead
to changes in the liquidity of the treatment group’s stocks, which would
overlay with the identification of the effects of uncertainty on stock liquidity.
Given these considerations, we use a sample of all observations in 2012 until
the fifth week after the week of uncertainty (w ∈ [1, 48]) for our baseline
regressions. Choosing all observations since the beginning of 2012 is con-
sistent with the definition of the treatment variable Ti for which we only
have data for the end of 2011. In the robustness checks we further limit the
17
sample to observations starting only 20 weeks prior to the week of uncer-
tainty (w ∈ [23, 48], u > 20). The post-treatment sample of five weeks (from
w = 44 to w = 48) was chosen heuristically. However, our results also hold
for longer post-treatment samples.
The time fixed effects serve the purpose of controlling for common varia-
tion in the respective liquidity measures, reducing the residual variance and
thereby increasing the power of our statistical tests. Standard errors for
all models are estimated conservatively, with standard errors independently
clustered at the level of both firms and weeks (Cameron et al., 2011).
3.5 Identification concerns
3.5.1 Actual uncertainty shock
Before addressing possible confounding effects, it is important to clearly de-
fine uncertainty, to distinguish it from risk and to build a case, that the
given setting allows to identify the effects of uncertainty. Both risk and
uncertainty describe a situation in which information about a future state
is limited. The main conceptual difference – in the understanding of the
seminal work of Knight (1921) – is that risk is perceived to be the mea-
surable part of this limited information, while uncertainty is perceived to
be the immeasurable part. In probabilistic language, risk allows to define a
distribution of potential outcomes while uncertainty does not allow to define
such a distribution.
We argue that the information set available on the potential outcomes
in the quasi-experiment studied here contains a significant uncertainty com-
ponent. The first source of uncertainty lies in whether Hurricane Sandy
would make landfall on the East Coast. Given the contradicting results of
the (quantitative) forecasting models of the NHC and the ECMWF, for most
parts of the trading week this potential outcome was at least very hard to
quantify.
After this source of uncertainty became less important towards the end
of the week, the second source of uncertainty came into play. The decisive
question was whether and to which extent REIT properties in New York
City’s evacuation zone would be damaged. Although the Greater New York
area did experience other hurricanes before, the nature and scale of Hurricane
Sandy was beyond any recent experience. As described earlier, the last
similar meteorological and hydrological setup was in 1821 (Brandon et al.,
2014), when New York was smaller and without skyscrapers. Therefore,
fully quantifying the potential outcomes was difficult. This left much room
for uncertainty to play a role in market participants’ trading decisions.
3.5.2 Actual investor concerns
To get a better grasp of whether market participants cared about the poten-
tial negative consequences of the storm, we test whether returns of REITs in
the treatment group were lower relative to returns of REITs in the first con-
trol group. Figure 4 presents cumulative returns and cumulative abnormal
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returns in the two weeks prior to and in the week after Hurricane Sandy’s
landfall, averaged for REITs with treatment intensity Ti > 0 and for REITs
with Ti = 0. While returns for both groups were almost indistinguishable on
the trading days between Monday, October 15 and Friday, October 19, 2012,
differences in returns accumulated over the week between Monday, October
22 and Friday, October 26, 2012, with returns being more negative for the
treatment group. The stronger divergence on Thursday, October 25 and Fri-
day 26, 2012 corresponds precisely with the time, when news reporting on
Hurricane Sandy grew particularly strong (see Figure 1) and the NHC track
forecast cone started to indicate an expected landfall around New York City
(see Figure 2).
We also conduct a more formal analysis of these differences by regressing
interaction terms of the treatment intensity measure Ti and trading day
indicator variables dd on returns and absolute returns, using daily return
observations from CRSP between Monday, October 01 and Friday, November
02, 2012 in the following specification:
yi,d = β0 + β1(dd=Oct.22 · Ti) + β1(dd=Oct.23 + ...
+ β8(dd=Nov.02 · Ti) + i,d , (3)
with yi,d denoting either returns Ri,d or abnormal returns ARi,d. The coef-
ficients β1 to β7 indicate average differences in returns or abnormal returns
relative to the baseline period between Monday, October 01 and Friday,
October 19, 2012. The red line indicates Hurricane Sandy’s landfall on Oc-
tober 29, 2012. Abnormal returns are calculated as ARi,d = Ri,d − βiMd,
with βi being estimated in Ri,d = αi + βiMd + i,d for each firm i sepa-
rately. Ri,d denotes stock returns for firm i at day d and Md denotes returns
from the Fama-French market factor. We use the time period between the
beginning of 2012 and Friday, October 12, 2012 as the calibration period.
Standard errors are independently clustered at the level of both firms and
weeks (Cameron et al., 2011).9
Appendix Table A.3.1 presents the results. Returns and abnormal re-
turns for REITs in the treatment group were indeed lower than those for
REITs in the first control group as Hurricane Sandy approached New York
City. All of the statistically significant coefficients for the week before Hur-
ricane Sandy made landfall are negative for both returns and abnormal re-
turns. Conversely, most of the statistically significant coefficients for the
interaction terms after the week of uncertainty are positive. As relatively
little damage to the buildings in the evacuation zone of New York City was
9This analysis differs from traditional return event studies. Instead of determining coun-
terfactual outcomes in returns with the help of an asset pricing model, we use observed
returns of REITs in the control group. Instead of testing whether abnormal returns –
determined as the difference between observed returns and returns predicted by an asset
pricing model – are significantly different from zero, we test whether differences in returns
between the treatment and the respective control groups are significantly different from
zero. In this sense, conducting this analysis not only with returns but also with abnor-
mal returns is only a way of further reducing residual variance to have greater statistical
power, of course assuming that the asset pricing model is correctly specified.
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Figure 4: Cumulative returns
This figure presents average daily cumulative returns as well as average cumulative ab-
normal returns for the treatment group and the first control group in the two weeks prior
to and one week after Hurricane Sandy’s landfall. The treatment group consists of REITs
holding property in the evacuation zone of New York City (Ti > 0). The first control
group consists of REITs without property holdings in the evacuation zone of New York
City (Ti = 0). Grey background marks indicate days on which the NYSE was closed, i.e.
weekends as well as Monday, October 27 and Tuesday, October 28, 2012. Red-striped
background marks indicate Monday, October 29, 2012 on which Hurricane Sandy made
landfall. Abnormal returns are calculated as ARi,d = Ri,d−βiMd, with βi being estimated
in Ri,d = αi + βiMd + i,d for each firm i separately, Ri,d denoting stock returns for firm
i at day d, Md denoting Fama-French market returns and using the time period between
the beginning of 2012 and Friday, October 12, 2012 as the calibration period.
observed, investor concerns seem to have been alleviated and the return
differentials did reverse to some extent.
3.5.3 Risk
The previous results for returns are encouraging in that investors seem to
have been concerned about the impending storm and looming uncertainty.
However, these results also raise the question whether returns decreased in
line with an expected increase in the market price of risk. In turn, the effect
of an risk increase on trading volume and bid-ask spreads could confound
the identification of the effect of an increase in uncertainty.
Previous literature suggests that an increase in risk should widen spreads.
Chung and Chuwonganant (2014) show empirically, that this relationship
not only holds for firm-specific but also for systematic risk proxied by the
VIX. This is in line with previous theoretical work such as Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) and Ho and Stoll (1981). Therefore, a simultaneous increase
in the market price of risk should lead to an overestimation of the effects of
uncertainty on bid-ask spreads.
The theoretical work by Easley and O’Hara (2010) suggests that as the
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market price of risk increases, traders reduce the riskiness of their portfolios.
This should lead to an increase in trading volume, offsetting the theorized
trading volume diminishing effects of uncertainty. Hence, a simultaneously
occurring increase in risk should lead to an underestimation of the effects
of uncertainty on trading volume. If the net effect of the uncertainty shock
and the potential risk shock on trading volume were to be negative, this
could be interpreted as even stronger confirmation for the tested theoretical
implication on trading volume.
We address the concerns about confounding variation in risk in two ways.
First, we test statistically whether the week of uncertainty was accompanied
by an increase intraday volatility as defined in subsection 3.2.10 Follow-
ing our baseline specifications (1) and (2), we are only interested in the
differences between the treatment and the control group in the week of un-
certainty. Table 3 presents the results in the first two columns. We focus
on the interaction terms between the indicator variables signifying the days
in the week prior to and the week after the week of uncertainty as well as
treatment intensity. None of the interaction terms dw=43 · Ti, dw>42 · Ti and
dw>43 · Ti is statistically significant, indicating that we cannot statistically
detect a simultaneous increase in risk.
Second, we add the same measure of risk to our set of control variables in
all regressions on trading volume and the different bid-ask spread measures.
In doing so, the confounding effect of an increase in risk for the treated REITs
relative to the respective control REITs should be accounted for.
3.5.4 Information asymmetries
Not only an increase in risk but also an increase in information asymme-
tries between investors of REITs in the treatment group relative to REITs in
the two control groups could have led to variation confounding the identi-
fication of the effect of uncertainty on trading volume and bid-ask spreads.
As Hurricane Sandy approached New York City, some investors might have
been either better equipped than others to process information available on
the exact location of REIT properties, the insurance status of these prop-
erties etc. or might even have been able to generate more direct private
information on REITs holding property in the evacuation zone. The extant
literature, such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985), suggests that an increase of
information asymmetries between market participants should lower trading
volume and should increase bid-ask spreads.
While the generation of private information is generally difficult to ob-
serve, some factors might have mitigate this concern. First, the location
of the individual properties is generally readily available to market partici-
pants through the website and reports of a given REIT or through financial
market information services such as SNL, that we also used to compile our
dataset that contains geo-coordinates for each property. In any case, dif-
10Unfortunately, more forward-looking measures of risk such as implied volatility from
options trading are largely unavailable for REITs.
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Table 3: Regression results for intraday volatility and price impact
This table presents difference-in-differences estimates comparing dollar volume or price
impact of a treatment group and the first control group in the week prior to Hurricane
Sandy’s landfall, i.e. the week of uncertainty. The treatment group consists of REITs
holding property in the evacuation zone of New York City. The first control group consists
of REITs without property holdings in the evacuation zone of New York City. Specifications
(1) and (3) are of the form: log(yi,w) = β0dw=43 +β1(dw=43 ·Ti) +Di=jΓ +Dw=u∆ + i,w.
Specifications (2) and (4) are of the form: log(yi,w) = β0dw>42 + β1dw>43 + β2(dw>42 ·
Ti) +β3(dw>43 ·Ti) +Di=jΓ +Dw=u∆ + i,w. i and w index firms and weeks. The dataset
contains weekly observations until the fifth week after the week of uncertainty (w = 43),
i.e. w ∈ [1, 48]. yi,w denotes either intraday volatility or price impact. dw and di are
indicator variables identifying firms and weeks. Di and Dw denote firm and time fixed
effects, i.e. matrices of dj ’s and du’s using the first firm’s identifier and the first week as
base category (j > 1 and u > 1) and not containing the week prior to Hurricane Sandy’s
landfall (u 6= 43). For brevity, firm and time fixed effects are omitted in this table. Ti
denotes the treatment intensity defined as the percentage share of the book value invested
in the evacuation zone of New York City, with Ti > 0 for the treatment group and Ti = 0
for both control groups. The treatment intensity Ti is not separately included in the
specifications since it is time-fixed and is already captured by the firm-fixed effects Di.
Xi,w denotes control variables, in this case intraday volatility and price impact. Standard
errors are independently clustered at the level of both firms and weeks (Cameron et al.,
2011). t-statistics are shown in parentheses, p-values are denoted as * for p < 0.05, ** for
p < 0.01 and *** for p < 0.001.
Dependent variable log(Intraday volatilityi,w) Price impacti,w
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent variables
dw=43 −0.309∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(−4.72) (−4.11)
dw>42 −0.303∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(−5.16) (−3.92)
dw>43 0.734
∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(10.67) (2.11)
dw=43 · Ti 0.993 0.035
(1.46) (1.72)
dw>42 · Ti 0.458 −0.002
(0.49) (−0.03)
dw>43 · Ti −5.483 −0.346
(−1.38) (−1.74)
Observations 3696 3696 3696 3696
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.65 0.79 0.79
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ferences in the availability of information would have to be correlated with
the treatment status in order to confound our analysis. Second, New York
City is arguably the best-known property investment area in the world, with
investors from all over the world being likely able to distinguish between
waterfront and non-waterfront properties, Upper and Lower Manhattan etc.
Third, the geographic location of the affected properties close to the NYSE
and many financial market participants will likely have made it quite difficult
to generate private information. Market participants could easily observe in
person, whether properties were properly secured and prepared for impend-
ing flooding etc.
We address any remaining concerns regarding the confounding effects of
information asymmetry in two ways. In line with the way we address con-
cerns about risk, we first test statistically whether the week of uncertainty
was accompanied by an increase in information asymmetries, approximated
by price impact as defined in subsection 3.2. We again follow our baseline
specifications (1) and (2). Table 3 presents the results in columns 3 and 4.
We focus on the interaction terms between the indicator variables signifying
the days in the week prior to and the week after the week of uncertainty
as well as treatment intensity. None of the interaction terms is statistically
significant, indicating that we cannot statistically detect a simultaneous in-
crease in information asymmetry.
Second, we also add our measure of information asymmetry to our set
of control variables in all regressions that follow. Any confounding effect of
an simultaneous increase in information asymmetry for the treated stocks
relative to the control stocks should thereby be accounted for.
4 Results
Table 4 presents the results of estimating model specifications (1) and (2) for
all four dependent variables. Panel I shows the results for the first control
group and Panel II for the second control group. We focus on the coefficients
of the interaction terms between the indicator variables signifying the week
of uncertainty and the treatment intensity, i.e. dw=43 · Ti or dw>42 · Ti and
dw>43 · Ti. Since the dependent variables are log-transformed, the regres-
sion coefficients of the respective interaction terms indicate the percentage
difference in stock liquidity between the treatment group and the control
group. According to the theory presented in section 2, the coefficient should
be negative for dollar volume and positive for the different spread measures.
First control group Columns 1 and 2 show the effects of the uncertainty
shock in week w = 43 on the dollar volume using the first control group,
which consists of all REITs without property holding in the evacuation zone
of New York City for both model specifications. The results indicate a
statistically significant and economically large effect. The point estimate of
−2.126 in column 1 implies that during the week of uncertainty, a REIT with
a treatment intensity of 10 percent had a 21 percent lower trading volume.
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With an average treatment intensity of 4 percent for the treatment group,
this relates to an ATT of about 8.5 percent. In column 2, we decompose this
effect into an initial treatment effect and a treatment reversal effect. The
point estimates for both effects are statistically significant and amount to
−2.068 and 2.632. This indicates that the dollar volume for the treatment
group dropped considerably in the week of uncertainty and increased again
in the following week, when Hurricane Sandy had passed New York City.
Columns 3 and 4 show similar results for the effect of uncertainty on the
closing spread. The point estimate of 1.738 in column 3 implies that the
ATT was about 7 percent. Column 4 illustrates that the closing spread also
shows a similar increase and reversal pattern as the dollar volume. Columns
5 to 8 present the results for quoted spread and effective spread. Estimating
specification (1) yields statistically significant point estimates of 0.509 in
column 5 for quoted spread and of 0.468 in column 7 for effective spread,
which convert into ATTs of about 2 percent and of about 1.9 percent. This is
considerably lower than for closing spread. Estimating model specification
(2) for quoted spread and effective spread only partially yields coefficients
that are significantly different from zero.
Second control group Using the second control group, which consists
of all REITs that do not have any properties in the states of New Jersey
and New York, the results for dollar volume and closing spread are mag-
nified. The magnification becomes apparent, for instance, when comparing
the point estimates for the interaction term in column 1 of Panel I and col-
umn 1 of Panel II, in which dollar volume is the dependent variable and
model specification (1) is used. While the point estimate is −2.126 for the
first control group, it is −3.062 for the second control group. These point
estimates relate to ATTs of 8.5 percent and 12 percent respectively. The
larger treatment effect for the second control group relative to the first con-
trol group makes intuitive sense. While the first control group is likely to be
also partially affected by the uncertainty shock since it also includes REITs
with properties in any affected areas outside New York City (e.g. properties
in Jersey City), the second control group is less likely to be affected by the
uncertainty shock since it puts more geographic restrictions on the selection
of the control firms. This observation also holds for closing spread, but the
results for quoted spread and effective spread further weaken when using the
second control group, both in terms of statistical and economic significance.
Overall, the results indicate a statistically and economically significant
impact of uncertainty on dollar volume and bid-ask spreads. This sup-
ports the negative impact of uncertainty on market liquidity hypothesized
by Easley and O’Hara (2010), Ozsoylev and Werner (2011) and Routledge
and Zin (2009). However, the results for closing spread are stronger than for
intraday spreads. This may be the case, because intraday spreads capture
more of the intraday demand and supply dynamics of securities unrelated to
long-term information rather than the uncertainty concerns of longer term
investors. Given that a considerable proportion of trading happens at closing
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auction prices and that institutional traders participate more in the closing
auction than intraday trading, it makes sense to assign closing spreads a
higher weight than intraday spreads. Nevertheless, all of our spread results
point in the same direction.
5 Robustness checks
The test the robustness of the results presented in the previous section with-
stand by focussing on two of the key identifying assumptions: The selection
of the pre-treatment time window and the sufficiency of the firm fixed effects
as well as intraday volatility and price impact to account for firm-specific
determinants of stock liquidity.
Shorter pre-treatment time window As argued previously in subsec-
tion 3.4, the length of the pre-treatment time window determines the refer-
ence observations relative to which a change in stock liquidity is measured.
Our initial choice of a sample that starts at the beginning of 2012 was guided
by the consistency with the definition of the treatment intensity variable, for
which data is only available for the end of 2011. In Appendix Table A.4.1
we present results when the sample is further limited to the 20 weeks prior
to the week of uncertainty. Panels and column numbers correspond to the
panels and column numbers presented in Table 4: Panel I present results for
the first control group, Panel II shows results for the second control group.
For dollar volume and closing spread, most coefficients for the interaction
term between the uncertainty week indicators and the treatment intensity
remain statistically significant. However, the size of the coefficient changes
slightly. When using dollar volume as the dependent variable, the effect size
is slightly reduced; when using closing spread as the dependent variable,
the effect size is slightly increased. This applies both to the use of the first
as well as the second control group. For the dollar volume specification in
column 1 of Panel I, the ATT is reduced from about 8.5 percent to about
6.6 percent. For the closing spread specification in column 3 of Panel I, the
ATT is increased from about 7 percent to about 9.7 percent. However, the
main difference between using either of the control groups remains the same.
The effect size is larger for the second control group. The results for quoted
spread and effective spread are weaker again, with hardly any coefficient of
the interaction terms being statistically different from zero.
Full covariate adjustment In our baseline specifications, we solely use
firm fixed effects as well as intraday volatility and price impact for hold-
ing firm-specific determinants of stock liquidity constant. In Appendix Ta-
ble A.4.4 we add a full set of alternative, time-varying control variables,
mostly firm fundamentals. These variables are further defined in Appendix
subsection A.1. However, the size of the observed treatment effects do not
change much by the inclusion of these additional explanatory variables and
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the effect size differences between the first and the second control group re-
main almost the same as well. This result is in line with the observation,
that REITs in the treatment and control groups differ only along very few di-
mensions other than in their property portfolio. Table 2 presents difference-
in-mean t-tests for all covariates in the week prior to the treatment. Except
for the leverage ratio and firm size, no statistically significant differences
can be observed. Even if such differences would be observed, however, they
would also have to systematically bias the effect of the uncertainty shock
on the treatment and control groups in order to invalidate the difference-
in-differences approach used for identification. For instance, higher levered
firms would have to react systematically different to the uncertainty shock.
Assuming that the selection of the added covariates is sufficiently complete
and valid, this seems not to be the case.
Lasso-based covariate adjustment To dispel any concerns about the se-
lection of the added covariates from the pool of possible covariates, we also
provide results where covariates are not selected subjectively but algorith-
mically. Belloni et al. (2014a) suggest to use a “post-double-selection” pro-
cedure based on the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (Lasso)
employed widely in the machine learning literature in order to conduct au-
tomatic variable selection. The underlying assumption is that a rather small
set of explanatory variables is responsible for explaining most of the varia-
tion in the dependent variable.11 This sparsity assumption is parameterized
as λ. Belloni et al. (2014a) suggest to use the heuristic introduced by Bickel
et al. (2009) to determine λ. We follow their suggestions and apply the post-
double-selection method with this heuristic to our dataset in order to select
the relevant covariates. The results are shown in Appendix Table A.4.6. Our
conclusions remain largely unchanged.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we provide an empirical test of recent theoretical work on the
effects of uncertainty on market liquidity. We use the week prior to Hurricane
Sandy’s landfall in October 2012 as a natural experiment, which provided an
environment of great uncertainty for stocks of REITs with property invested
in the evacuation zone of New York City. Due to the unprecedented strength,
scale and nature of the Hurricane, the potential consequences of the storm
were nearly impossible to quantify. We argue that the observed uncertainty
shock was an uncertainty shock in the sense of Knight (1921), rather than
purely a period of increased risk. For identification we use a difference-
in-differences framework and compare the trading volume and the bid-ask
spread of stocks of REITs with and without property invested in the affected
area. The results for trading volume are both statistically and economically
significant and confirm the theoretical implications. The results for bid-ask
11Belloni et al. (2014b) provide a more formalized but yet intuitive introduction to this
stream of the literature.
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spread generally show statistically significant coefficients in the direction
predicted by theory. We interpret this as tentative empirical evidence on
the effects of uncertainty on market liquidity. Together these results suggest
a decrease in welfare as fewer gains from trade are realized. This provides
some evidence on the potential magnitude of the effects of uncertainty on
markets.
We see various avenues for further research on the effects of uncertainty
on market liquidity and market microstructure in general. On a theoretical
level, the effects of uncertainty on liquidity have only started to enter the
literature. To our knowledge, the models of Easley and O’Hara (2010),
Ozsoylev and Werner (2011) and Routledge and Zin (2009) are the only
theoretical models that explicitly address uncertainty in the understanding
of Knight (1921) so far. In this regard the theoretical literature on market
liquidity is lacking behind the fast developing stream of literature on the
effects of uncertainty in the macroeconomic and macro-finance context.12
One aspect worth exploring might be to model the effects of uncertainty on
other dimensions of market liquidity such as price impact.
At the methodological level, the quasi-experimental empirical test pro-
vided in this paper is only one of many possible ways of testing the theory
of the effects of uncertainty on market liquidity. While quasi-experimental
setups can provide valid tests of theoretical predictions, they are usually
scarce, do not occur repeatedly and therefore cannot be easily replicated.
Laboratory experiments might be an attractive avenue to address these con-
cerns. For instance, artificial security markets in the spirit of the experiments
described in Smith (1962) might be a well-suited complement to evidence
collected in the field.
12See Bloom et al. (forthcoming) for a recent and highly visible example in the macroeco-
nomic context and Segal et al. (2015) for a recent example in the macro-finance context.
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A Appendix
A.1 Variable definitions
q denotes end of quarter,
w denotes end of a week in this quarter,
d denotes end of a trading day in this week,
t denotes points of time during this trading day (i.e. intraday data).
Dollar volumei,d = No. of shares tradedi,d × Closing pricei,d
Dollar volumei,w = Mean(Dollar volumei,d) for all d in a given week w
Closing spreadi,d =
Closing ask pricei,d − Closing bid pricei,d
1/2× (Closing ask pricei,d + Closing bid pricei,d)
Closing spreadi,w = Mean(Closing spreadi,d) for all d in a given week w
Quoted spreadi,t =
Ask pricei,t − Bid pricei,t
Mi,t
with midpoint price Mi,t = 1/2× (Ask pricei,t + Bid pricei,t)
Quoted spreadi,d = Mean(Quoted spreadi,t) for all t in a given trading day d
Quoted spreadi,w = Mean(Quoted spreadi,d) for all d in a given week w
Effective spreadi,t =
|Traded pricei,t −Mi,t|
Mi,t
with midpoint price Mi,t = 1/2× (Ask pricei,t + Bid pricei,t)
Effective spreadi,d = Mean(Effective spreadi,t) for all t in a given trading day d
Effective spreadi,w = Mean(Effective spreadi,d) for all d in a given week w
Intraday volatilityi,d =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
close∑
t=open
(Ri,t − R¯)2
with Ri,t denoting 5-minute returns of the respective
midpoint price Mi,t
Intraday volatilityi,w = Mean(Intraday volatilityi,d) for all d in a given week w
Price impacti,t = Di,t
Mi,t+5min −Mi,t
Mi,t
with Di,t being + 1 for buyer initiated trades and− 1 for
seller initiated trades
Price impacti,d = Mean(Price impacti,t) for all t in a given trading day d
Price impacti,w = Mean(Price impacti,d) for all d in a given week w
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Debt-to-assetsi,q =
Total debti,q
Total assetsi,q
Debt-to-assetsi,w = Debt-to-assetsi,q for all w in quarter q
Cash-to-assetsi,q =
Cashi,q
Total assetsi,q
Cash-to-assetsi,w = Cash-to-assetsi,q for all w in quarter q
Market-to-booki,w =
Market capi,w + (Total assetsi,q−1 − Book equityi,q−1)
Total assetsi,q−1
Capex-to-assetsi,q =
Undeprec. investmentsi,q −Undeprec. investmentsi,q−1
Total assetsi,q−1
Capex-to-assetsi,w = Capex-to-assetsi,q for all w in quarter q
Probability of defaulti,w = As defined by Bharath and Shumway (2008)
with one year rolling window
Return on assetsi,q =
EBITDAi,q
Total assetsi,q
Return on assetsi,w = Return on assetsi,q for all w in quarter q
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A.2 REIT properties in Manhattan
Figure A.2.1: REIT properties in Manhattan
Individual properties are shown as black circles. The sub-evacuation zones are colored in
red: Zone A in dark red, zone B in medium red, zone C in light red.
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A.3 Regression results for returns
Table A.3.1: Regression results for returns
This table presents estimates comparing daily returns (Ri,d) and abnormal returns (ARi,d)
between the treatment group and the first control group in the two weeks prior to and
one week after Hurricane Sandy’s landfall. The treatment group consists of REITs holding
property in the evacuation zone of New York City (Ti > 0). The first control group
consists of REITs without property holdings in the evacuation zone (Ti = 0). The dataset
contains daily observations between Monday, October 01 and Friday, November 02, 2012.
The specification is of the form: yi,d = β0 + β1(dd=Oct.22 · Ti) + β1(dd=Oct.23 + ... +
β8(dd=Nov.02 · Ti) + i,d, with yi,d denoting either Ri,d or ARi,d. The interaction terms
dd · Ti consist of trading day indicator variables dd and treatment intensity Ti, defined
as the percentage share of the book value invested in the evacuation zone of New York
City. The coefficients β1 to β8 indicate average differences in returns or abnormal returns
relative to the baseline period between Monday, October 01 and Friday, October 19, 2012.
The red line indicates Hurriance Sandy’s landfall on October 29, 2012. Abnormal returns
are calculated as ARi,d = Ri,d−βiMd, with βi being estimated in Ri,d = αi +βiMd + i,d
for each firm i separately, Ri,d denoting stock returns for firm i at day d, Md denoting
Fama-French market returns and using the time period between the beginning of 2012
and Friday, October 12, 2012 as the calibration period. Standard errors are independently
clustered at the level of both firms and weeks (Cameron et al., 2011). t-statistics are
shown in parentheses, p-values are denoted as * for p < 0.05, ** for p < 0.01 and *** for
p < 0.001.
Dependent variable Returns (Ri,d) Abnormal returns (ARi,d)
Independent variables
dd=Oct.22 · Ti 0.007 0.002
(0.12) (0.03)
dd=Oct.23 · Ti −0.106∗∗∗ 0.014
(−3.77) (0.62)
dd=Oct.24 · Ti 0.082 0.105
(1.47) (1.84)
dd=Oct.25 · Ti −0.132∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗
(−2.86) (−3.47)
dd=Oct.26 · Ti −0.112∗∗ −0.109∗∗
(−2.89) (−2.63)
dd=Oct.31 · Ti 0.051∗∗∗ 0.034
(3.58) (1.61)
dd=Nov.01 · Ti 0.049∗ −0.068∗
(2.11) (−2.24)
dd=Nov.02 · Ti 0.023 0.118∗∗∗
(0.61) (3.72)
Observations 1771 1771
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02
A.4 Regression results for robustness checks
– See following pages –
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